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Abstract
We analyze the Italian Personal Income Tax (PIT) in the light of the different tools available to the
government to achieve income redistribution. We focus in particular on three mechanisms: marginal
tax rates, deductions and tax credits. Exploiting an extended version of the standard Pfähler (1990)
decomposition, we estimate the contribution of each of these three tools to the overall redistributive
effect of the PIT, using administrative data on more than 1.3 million individual tax returns. Our
estimates suggest that more than half of the total PIT redistributive effect is due to the two most
important tax credits (the tax credit for employment and the tax credit for retirement income), while
the marginal rates schedule contribution is about 40 per cent. On the contrary, most of the itemized
expenditures do not show any sizable impact on redistribution.
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1. Introduction
In  most  of  the  countries  around  the  world,  the  Personal  Income  Tax  (hereafter  PIT)  is  a
comprehensive  tax  on  individual  incomes  that  is  thought  as  a  fundamental  tool  to  redistribute
resources thanks to its progressive nature. This role of PIT is confirmed by the literature analyzing
the political economy of redistribution, which shows however a great variation around the globe in
terms of both the importance of PIT revenues and of the redistribution achieved, together with the
key role played by political  institutions in influencing the performance (e.g.,  Verbist  and Figari
2014; Keefer and Milanovic 2014; Ardañaz and Scartascini 2013; Padovano and Turati 2012). Italy
is an interesting case study in this respect: it is a country where total public revenues (and spending)
represent a large share of GDP, more than forty percent in latest years; the efficiency impact of this
high level of taxes is pretty much clear from the worrying economic prospect in terms of potential
growth and productivity; but the degree of redistribution achieved by the overall tax-benefit system
is among the lowest in the context of Western countries (e.g., Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy 2008).
When better exploring the role of PIT in this context, results are somewhat mixed. By focusing only
on PIT around the 1990 fiscal year, Wagstaff et al. (1999) show that also the redistributive effect of
the Italian PIT is among the lowest in a group of OECD countries. This result is further confirmed
by more recent empirical analyses considering EU countries, which also reinforce the substantial
role  played by the  PIT in  achieving  the  overall  redistributive  effect  within  each  country  (e.g.,
Verbist and Figari 2014). On the contrary, Joumard, Pisu and Block (2013), relying on a synthetic
indicator of tax progressivity, suggest that the Italian PIT is quite close to the OECD average in
terms of redistributive performance; while cash transfers, mostly represented by old age pensions
related to previous earnings,  show very little  progressivity.  Hence,  the poor performance of the
Italian tax-benefit system should be identified on the spending side more than on the tax side.
But besides the level of redistribution,  how does PIT redistribute resources? What are the most
effective  tools  within the PIT, those that  contribute  most to  achieve  redistribution?  In order  to
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answer these questions, in this paper we analyze the Italian PIT in the light of the different tools that
are available to the government in order to influence the degree of progressivity of the tax, as well
as its redistributive role: (1) deductions, (2) marginal tax rates, and (3) tax credits. In particular, we
compute the Reynolds-Smolensky index and decompose it according to an extended version of the
Pfähler (1990) methodology,  considering a sample of more than 1.3 million  individual  real  tax
return forms. Our estimates suggest that more than half of the total redistributive effect of the PIT is
due to just two tax credits (the one for employment and the one for retirement income), while 40 per
cent is due to the marginal rate schedule. On the contrary, most of the itemized expenditures do not
show any sizable impact. These general conclusions are robust to a number of additional exercises,
including the decomposition of the Reynolds-Smolensky index according to the recent methodology
proposed  by  Onrubia,Picos-Sánchez,  and  del  Carmen  Rodado (2014).  In  a  policy  perspective,
consistently with conclusions reached for other countries (e.g., Poterba 2011), our findings call for
an agenda that methodically revise all categories of tax credits in order to simplify the structure of
the PIT, broaden the tax base, and obtain resources to lower marginal tax rates or to increase the tax
credits  showing  the  highest  contribution  to  the  overall  redistributive  effect;  in  this  respect,  a
particularly  important  area would be to  reform tax credits  for dependent  individuals  within the
household.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides essential  background information on the
Italian  PIT,  while  section  3  is  devoted  to  our  empirical  analysis:  we  first  present  the  Pfähler
decomposition, we then describe our dataset and the main results. Section 4 briefly concludes the
paper.
2. The Personal Income Tax in Italy
Like in many other countries, the Italian PIT (Imposta sui Redditi delle Persone Fisiche, IRPEF) is a
progressive  tax  on  individual  incomes  introduced  in  the  Italian  legislation  in  1974,  and
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discretionally modified almost every year in most of the relevant parameters (like the marginal rate
schedule, the tax allowances, or the tax credits). It provides about one fourth of the total public
revenues  in  the  latest  years,  approximately  158  billion  euro  in  2013  (excluding  regional  and
municipal surtaxes), which represents one tenth of the Italian GDP. As also recalled by a recent
report  on  tax  erosion  in  the  Italian  PIT  (see,  MEF  2011),  the  original  aim  was  to  define  a
comprehensive income tax  à la Schanz–Haig–Simons, adding up all possible income categories.
These  still  include  effective  labour  and  pension  incomes,  entrepreneurial  incomes,  figurative
property incomes, incomes from financial capital, plus a residual category trying to capture most of
the capital gains, and all other income sources which cannot be summarized in one of the previous
groups. In practice, however, fiscal rules are such that most of the incomes from financial capital
are typically not included in the tax base (and taxed separately with a substitute tax), which by itself
is eroding the tax base (see, again, MEF 2011). As a consequence, labour and pension incomes
represent the lion’s share of the tax base, more than eighty percent of the whole taxable income.
More precisely, in recent years, active workers incomes are about half of the whole taxable income,
while pensions (de facto, a deferred labour income) amount to one third of the total.
Leaving aside the issue of income categories typically excluded from the PIT base (like, as already
remarked, capital incomes, which are taxed at a lower proportional rate via a substitute tax), the PIT
degree of progressivity is influenced by: (1) tax allowances (i.e., deductions from the tax base), (2)
increasing marginal tax rates, and (3) tax credits (i.e., reductions in tax liability). Both the first and
the third  category  represent  tax expenditures,  i.e.  foregone government  revenues  as  a  result  of
preferential treatment of certain taxpayers, which are extensively used in the Italian tax system (e.g.,
Tyson 2014). According to available estimates (e.g., OECD 2010), foregone revenues because of
tax expenditures related to the PIT amount to about 4.7% of GDP (40.4% of PIT revenues) in Italy,
compared to other European countries like Spain (2.6% of GDP), Germany (0.55%) and France
(0.81%); figures that make Italy more similar to the USA (where PIT tax expenditures are estimated
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at a 4.8% of GDP) and the UK (5.4%), in contrast with the different orientation in terms of the
benefit system, since public spending is much higher in Italy than in both the USA and the UK. This
extensive role played by tax expenditures makes it crucial understanding their redistributive role for
designing a better tax system.
Since our data refer to the year 2011, we describe here the main institutional characteristics of the
2011  PIT concerning  deductions,  marginal  tax  rates,  and  tax  credits,  leaving  to  the  Technical
Appendix 1 the details. First, the Italian tax law considers two different kinds of  allowances:  a
deduction for the cadastral income of the main residence (on housing taxation in Italy, see, e.g.,
Pellegrino,  Piacenza  and  Turati  2012);  a  deduction  for  items  like  compulsory  social  security
contributions  to  welfare  and  pension  schemes  for  self-employed  individuals,  alimonies  and
donations. Second, marginal tax rates ranges from 23 per cent to 43 per cent; they have been varied
last time in 2007, and have remained unchanged since then (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Third,
the Italian law admits – similarly to other countries – three distinct kinds of effective tax credits: (1)
a sort of ‘Making Work Pay’ tax credits, i.e. credits for wage income from employment, pensions,
self-employment and similar incomes. According to available estimates, this is by far the largest tax
expenditure in the Italian PIT, amounting to more than 37 billion euro in 2010 (about 2.41 percent
of GDP; e.g., MEF 2011; Tyson 2014). Leaving aside pensions, a sort of deferred labor income,
these credits aim at realizing a qualitative discrimination of income sources. They are thought to
promote labor force participation, making work more attractive, and to support low income earners
at risk of social exclusion even if employed (e.g., European Commission 2014). (2) Tax credits for
dependent relatives, amounting to 10 billion euro (about 0.67 percent of GDP; e.g., MEF 2011;
Tyson 2014), with the aim of lowering the average tax rate for taxpayers with dependent family
members with respect to those without, and of achieving horizontal redistribution. (3) Tax credits
for specific expenditure items, which include very different types of spending and have different
purposes: for example, tax credits for medical expenses and childcare centers fees show a clear
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orientation towards welfare goals, while tax credits for home restructuring aim at sustaining the
construction sector  by supporting private  demand (MEF 2011).  These expenditure items  can be
classified  in  three  large  categories  according  to  the  percentage  (19,  36 and 55 percent)  of  the
expense the tax law admits as a reduction of liability. There are nineteen different items (such as
expenses for health care and mortgage interests, but also for veterinary expenses) allowing the 19
percent tax credits.  The 36 percent tax credit  are allowed for home restructuring,  whilst  the 55
percent tax credit are allowed for a number of different interventions for energy saving. Altogether,
the  tax  law  for  2011  admits  thirty  different  tax  credit  for  expenditure  items,  which  makes
administratively quite complicated the PIT structure. 
3. Assessing the PIT redistributive effect
3.1. The extended Pfähler methodology
As the PIT makes use of (1) deductions, (2) increasing marginal tax rates, and (3) tax credits to
define its degree of progressivity, in a policy perspective it is important to understand which of
these three different tools contributes more to define the PIT redistributive effect. To this end, we
use the methodology first  developed by Pfähler  (1990),  extended by Lambert  (2001),  and later
completed and summarised by Urban (2006). Here we further expand the original methodology in
order to consider the impact of each of the several allowances and tax credits characterizing the
Italian  tax  code.  In  particular,  the  overall  Reynolds-Smolensky  index  is  ‘decomposed’ in  the
contributions  due  to  (1)  deductions,  (2)  the  rate  schedule  and  (3)  each  tax  credit.  Technical
Appendix 2 provides the relevant details.  Notice that,  in order for the Pfähler decomposition to
work, taxpayer’s total deductions cannot be greater than her gross income; or, similarly, taxpayer’s
total tax credits cannot be greater that her gross tax liability. These considerations impose a choice
in  the  empirical  implementation  of  the  decomposition  about  the  order  with  which  to  apply
deductions or tax credits for the taxpayers with null net tax liability. In what follows, we decided to
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apply the following order:     321 iMRiiMRii cxcxc   (where  represent a preference ordering in the
use  of  tax  credits);  tax  credits  for  earned  income  come  first,  then  tax  credits  for  dependent
individuals  within the household,  and finally  tax credits  for expenditure items, (and among the
latter, we decided to apply the ordering shown in the tax return). Unsurprisingly, because of the low
share  of  taxpayers  with  null  net  tax  liability  within  our  dataset1,  results  discussed  below  are
substantially unaffected by the use of a different ordering. Nevertheless, as a further robustness
check, in what follows we also apply the new methodology proposed by Onrubia,  Picos-Sánchez
and del Carmen Rodado (2014), which allow to overcome the choice of ordering.
3.2. The data
We run the Pfähler decomposition analysis using data provided by the Centri di Assistenza Fiscale
(literally, Tax Assistance Centres, CAF) of the Associazione Cristiana Lavoratori Italiani (literally,
Italian Association of Christian Workers,  ACLI).  The CAF-ACLI assists more than one million
taxpayers and collects all information required in filling in the tax return. This allows us to access
very detailed data on  all different types of incomes, as well as allowances and credits, which are
largely unavailable to researchers running microsimulation models on survey data. In particular, we
have full information for the 2011 fiscal year on 1,370,982 individual tax returns Modello 730. This
is a simplified income tax return, which can be filed only if the taxpayer has a withholding agent in
Italy in the period of the filing of the tax return, and does not have business incomes. There are two
main advantages in using this tax return: first, not any calculation is required to the taxpayer, since
calculations are made by the Tax Assistance Centre;  second, the balance resulting from the tax
return is directly withheld or refunded to the employee in her pay slip for the month of July. 2 This is
the reason why a withholding agent in Italy is required, and why employees and pensioners with
large amounts in allowances and tax credits are particularly keen at using this way to declare their
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incomes.  All  data  have  been  anonymised  to  ensure  individual  privacy  according  to  the  Data
Protection Law. Given the characteristics of the Italian PIT described above, and to consider a more
homogeneous sample, we decided to exclude from the analysis the few taxpayers (56,105) who are
not  employees  or  pensioners,  but  have  received  their  incomes  from  various  sources,  mainly
property incomes,  and have very low incomes,  most of them less than one thousand euro; this
choice does not alter our main conclusions below. Our final sample includes 1,314,877 individuals.
However, the advantage of accessing very detailed information comes at a cost, which is evident by
looking  at  Figure  1,  where  we  plot  the  distribution  of  gross  incomes  in  our  dataset  and  the
corresponding distribution on the same fiscal year made available by the Department of Finance of
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (2013). Despite being very large (including about 3.2 percent
of all Italian tax returns), our dataset clearly overestimates employees and taxpayers belonging to
the middle class and underestimates poorest taxpayers with respect to the whole distribution. These
features are clear also when considering more formally the most important redistributive indices in
Table 1, where Column ‘CAF’ refers to our data and Column ‘Microsimulation model’ computes
the corresponding figures for the whole Italian PIT by means of a microsimulation model using
survey data provided by the Bank of Italy (Morini and Pellegrino 2014). For instance, the Gini
coefficient of the gross income distribution for our data is 0.3191, whilst that of the net income
distribution is 0.2705 using CAF data. Both figures are unsurprisingly lower than those obtained
from the microsimulation model: Gini coefficient of the gross income distribution is 0.4434, whilst
that of the net income distribution is 0.3914. Clearly, the less dispersed income distribution of our
sample will reduce the room for the redistributive role of PIT. However, this is not really an issue
for  our  analysis,  since  we  are  more  interested–  considering  the  Pfähler  decomposition  –  in
understanding the  relative role of tax credits, allowances and marginal tax rates, and not in the
absolute magnitude of the degree of redistribution.
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A second drawback in using administrative data is represented by the difficulties  in identifying
households starting from anonymised individual tax returns. Unfortunately, in Italy as elsewhere,
single taxpayers have to assess individually their incomes, their allowances, and the credits they are
entitled to. It is then impossible, in the absence of additional information, to couple for instance two
married individuals forming a household, when they both work and file individual tax returns. It is
also  impossible  to  know  whether  these  two  individuals  have  non-dependent  children  in  their
household. We will discuss both limits of our data below.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.3. Results
Before moving to the extended Pfähler decomposition, let us first concentrate on the distribution
across taxpayers of all allowances and tax credits, an information that is usually unavailable when
using survey data.3 Notice that also the assessment recently provided by the Ministry of Finance
(see MEF 2011) of all tax expenditures available in the Italian Tax Code does not allow to obtain
this  information.  For  each  allowance  or  credit,  the  report  concentrates  on  the  total  foregone
revenues,  as  well  as  on  the  number  of  taxpayers  involved,  distinguishing  also  individuals  by
geographical  areas  and  income  brackets,  but  does  not  consider  explicitly  the  shape  of  the
distribution, which is what we add here. For each specific item, our analysis in Table 2 shows the
Gini coefficient, the concentration coefficient, the share of taxpayers with positive deductions and
tax credits, and their average values. For instance, let consider the tax credit for mortgage interests
on the main residence. This item is positive only for 14.4 percent of taxpayers, which explains why
the Gini coefficient is very high (0.91); on the contrary, since the share of taxpayers owning the
main residence is decreasing with income, the corresponding concentration coefficient is expected
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to be lower (0.28).  Figure 2 provides a visual  representation  of the Gini  and the concentration
curves for this item.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
Few considerations emerge from Table 2. First, despite the large number of expenditure items for
which allowances and tax credits are available4, very few are used by a large number of taxpayers.
These include for instance out-of-pocket health expenses, itemized by more than 60 per cent of
individuals in our sample. Despite the large number of taxpayers exploiting these tax credits, their
concentration is pretty much high, since both average expenses and the number of individuals are
increasing with income. However, average spending are likely to be a small fraction of taxpayers
income. Second, most tax credits are used by very few individuals, so that their Gini coefficient is
very high. A clear example are the expenses for guide dogs for blind individuals, characterized by a
Gini of 1. Average expenses are however pretty much high in this case, suggesting that these can
represent  a  large  share  of  taxpayers  income.  Third,  ‘Making  Work  Pay’ tax  credits  (for  both
employment and retirement income), which are linearly decreasing with income, are characterized
by the lowest Gini indices, and negative concentration coefficients, showing the most ‘fair’ side of
the whole system of tax credits and deductions. Fourth, tax credits for dependent family members,
which are also decreasing with income, show higher Gini with respect to ‘Making Work Pay’ tax
credits and positive concentration coefficients. Interestingly, only few taxpayers make use of these
credits.
These considerations are clearly confirmed by the Pfähler (1990) decomposition reported in Table
3, columns ‘Whole sample’.  Considering the three tools available to government to modify the
PIT’s degree of redistribution, tax credits are by far those most effective in the Italian 2011 PIT:
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according to the Pfähler (1990) decomposition, 60.38 percent of the RS index is due to their role.
The  statutory  rate  schedule  contributes  a  share  of  38.50  percent,  while  deductions  affect
redistribution with a mere 1.11 percent. These shares are quite different from, for instance, those
computed  by  Onrubia,  Picos-Sánchez and  del  Carmen  Rodado (2014)  for  Spain,  a  country
characterized by a similar progressivity index according to Joumard, Pisu and Block (2013), but
where deductions play a much bigger role. Hence, it is a specific choice of the Italian government to
focus  redistribution  within  the  PIT on the  use of  tax credits.  However,  the  contribution  of  the
numerous tax credits is largely different. Indeed, more than half of the total redistributive effect of
the  PIT  is  due  to  the  ‘Making  work  pay’ sort  of  tax  credits,  in  particular  the  tax  credit  for
employment (20.85 percent of the total) and the tax credit for retirement income (35.54 percent).
On the contrary, most of the other credits do not show any sizable impact. For instance, tax credits
for dependent  spouse and dependent  children contribute  with a  share of  1.45 percent  and 2.87
percent, respectively. Since half of the support to families goes through these tax breaks, this can
help explain  why the Italian  tax-benefit  system provides  a  limited  support  to  households,  well
below the OECD average of about 2 percent of GDP (OECD 2011).
Moreover, itemized expenditures account for less than one percent of the total redistributive effect,
and some tax credits show a negative contribution to the overall redistributive effect. For example,
one of the most common categories among taxpayers, health expenses, contributes with a mere 0.65
percent. Tax credit for home restructuring shows instead a negative contribution, reducing the total
redistributive effect by 1.09 percentage points. Of course, one can argue that tax credits for itemized
expenses are not thought mostly for redistributive purposes, but to subsidize consumption of certain
goods and services.  However,  even from the  point  of  view of  efficiency,  they  do not  seem to
perform very well  according to available  evidence on specific  items. For instance,  Jappelli  and
Pistaferri  (2007) find that  changes in  the deductibility  of mortgage interests,  following the PIT
reforms in 1992-1994, did not affect the demand for mortgage debts; the authors explain this fact
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with borrowing constraints and the lack of financial information about the after-tax interest rate. As
for life  insurance,  Jappelli  and Pistaferri  (2003) exploit  – still  in the context  of the 1992-1994
reforms of the Italian PIT – the elimination of tax incentives in life insurance contracts for investors
with high marginal tax rates and the introduction of incentives for those with low rates. Again, they
find no effect of these fiscal reforms, neither on the demand for life insurances, nor on the amount
invested. Notice that – according to our calculations – tax credits for mortgage interests contribute
either to a modest 0.19 percent of the total redistributive effect considering debts subscribed for the
main residence, or zero for other types of mortgages. Contribution of tax credit for life insurance is
even negative. Adding to the fact that they do not contribute to redistribution, most of the itemized
credits and deductions do certainly play a role in making the tax structure more complicated from
an administrative  point  of  view (for  both  taxpayers  and Tax  Authorities),  and more  subject  to
pressures from various lobby groups,  a problem emphasized also by international  organizations
(see, e.g., OECD 2010; Tyson 2014).
3.4. Discussion and policy implications
Our findings seem to suggest that tax expenditures should be revised. However, these results are
subject to a number of limitations that needs to be discussed before drawing any policy conclusions.
One main problem is the use of individual tax returns, which implies that the analysis is conducted
at the individual level. This can severely limit for instance the redistributive role of tax credits for
dependent relatives, which appear to play a minor role according to the findings discussed above.
To overcome this problem we consider two additional sub-samples. The first one only includes
taxpayers with dependent spouse and/or children; to be sure that all  children are dependent we
consider a very restrictive definition, identifying only taxpayers with each child below the age of 6.
In order to obtain equivalent incomes, we then apply the equivalence scale given by the square root
of the number of households’ components. The second subsample is obtained by adding to the first
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one all single-member households. Results are in Table 3, columns ‘Only families with children’
and ‘Families and singles’ respectively. When only households with children are considered, the
role of tax credits increases from 60 to 72 percent of the RS index, while the share due to the
marginal rate schedule goes from 38 to 27 percent. Unsurprisingly, most of the variation is related
to the tax credits for dependent spouse and dependent children, while the role of the ‘Making Work
Pay’ credits  is reduced. However,  when widening the sample including also singles,  results  are
closer to our baseline estimates. The marginal rate schedule is responsible of about 32 percent of the
RS index, while tax credits explain a share of 67 percent. More importantly, the role of the tax
credits  for  dependent  spouse  and  children  are  substantially  reduced  to  about  6  and  3  percent
respectively,  while the weight of credit  for retirement  income sharply increases,  suggesting that
most of the single-member households are indeed widowed elderly living alone. All in all, however,
these results do not change our main conclusion above with respect to the role played by credits for
itemized expenditures, which still remain negligible, and sometimes negative.
A second issue is related to the representativeness of our sample, since – from Figure 1 – it over-
represents the middle class. To overcome this shortcoming, we run a decomposition exercise with a
microsimulation model using data from the 2012 Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
provided by the Bank of Italy, which are instead representative of the Italian population and are
widely used for the analysis of redistribution. As already discussed above, this comes at the cost of
not being able to distinguish all credits for itemized expenditure. Results from this exercise are in
Table 4. Considering individuals or equivalent households produces substantially the same picture,
which is actually quite close to our results on the whole sample in Table 3. Considering individuals,
the largest share of the RS index (about 51 percent) is explained by the ‘Making Work Pay’ tax
credits, while the marginal rate schedule makes up a share of about 41 percent and the credits for
dependent spouse and children 5 percent.  Considering equivalent households, the corresponding
values are 46, 40 and 13 percent, respectively. These figures are very close to those coming from
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our decomposition exercise on CAF data. We find that deductions still play a very minor role (about
2-4 percent), though a bit larger than in our results on CAF data. Finally, we confirm the negligible
role  played  by  tax  credits  on  itemized  expenditures  too.  Besides  reassuring  on  the
representativeness of our sample, these findings are comforting also on the issue of considering
individuals versus households.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
A third issue that can bias our results is the ordering required by the Pfähler decomposition to work.
We already observed that, given the small number of taxpayers with null net tax liability, the choice
of ordering should have minor implications for our findings. Nevertheless, a recent improvement
proposed by Onrubia,  Picos-Sánchez and  del Carmen Rodado (2014) allows us to overcome this
issue.  We then rerun the same decomposition exercises on the whole sample,  the subsample of
families with children aged less than 6, and the subsample of these families and single-member
households. Results are in Table 3 and provide a consistent pictures with respect to the standard
Pfähler methodology. Limiting the discussion to the whole sample, we find that the share of the RS
index explained by the marginal rate schedule is 42 percent with the Onrubia,  Picos-Sánchez and
del Carmen Rodado (2014) methodology, while the share of tax credits is 56 percent. These figures
compare with 38 and 60 percent using the standard Pfähler methodology. As for deductions, results
are almost identical: 1.22 with the new approach, 1.11 percent with the standard one.
Finally, also tax evasion could impact on our results. This is an important issue within the Italian
PIT, since estimates of the tax gap are relatively large among Western countries, though they might
be upward biased by not acknowledging the role of illegal production (see, e.g., the discussion in
Ardizzi, Petraglia, Piacenza and Turati 2014). We are not able to consider this issue further with our
data. However, we can build on available literature to provide some speculative observations on the
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likely effect of tax evasion on the redistributive effect of the Italian PIT. For instance, Fiorio and
D’Amuri  (2005)  show that,  contrary  to  what  one  can  expect,  not  only  self-employed  but  also
employees  hide income from tax authorities, especially in lower deciles. Hence,
by allowing unskilled workers to supplement their  little income, tax evasion
improves equality and makes the PIT more progressive. Of course, this opens
the issue of  potential horizontal  inequities and re-ranking effects that might
arise between tax evaders and fully compliant taxpayers (see also Albarea et
al. 2015, on this point). The impact on the relative role of tax deductions, tax
credits, and the marginal rate schedule is more difficult to identify, and rests on
the characteristics of tax evaders in the bottom deciles.
What  are  then  the  policy  implications  of  our  findings?  Considering  the  standard  Pfähler
methodology, more than 90 percent of the whole redistribution is made up by the rate schedule and
two ‘Making Work Pay’ sort of credits, for current employees and for pensioners. The contribution
of credits for itemized expenditures and tax deductions is negligible, and even negative in some
cases. Hence, credits and deductions for expenditure items should be revised taking into account the
goal that is pursued and the potential alternatives (in this sense, see also, e.g., Tyson 2014; MEF
2011; OECD 2010). For instance, tax credit for health expenses (which include co-payments for
accessing publicly provided treatments) should be compared with the increase in direct health care
spending.  Tax credits  for mortgage interest  should be compared with social  housing initiatives.
Eliminating some of these allowances and credits might free resources to lower the average tax rate,
either by modifying the marginal rate schedule or by increasing tax credits that are effective in
influencing redistribution. In this framework, one should carefully consider credits for dependent
spouse and children, since we have shown that they can play a crucial role in terms of horizontal
redistribution, despite the little share of RS index they explain.
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4. Concluding remarks
In this paper we apply an extended version of the standard Pfähler approach in order to estimate the
contribution of the tax deductions, the marginal rate schedule, and the tax credits to the overall
redistributive performance of the Italian PIT. The analysis is based on a very large sample of real
tax return forms provided by the Tax Assistance Centres of the Italian Association of Christian
Workers, which allow us to estimate the contribution of each specific deduction/credit admitted by
the tax legislation.
Our estimates suggest that more than half of the total redistributive effect of the PIT is due to the tax
credit for employment and the tax credit for retirement income, while the marginal rate schedule
contribute with about 40 per cent. On the contrary, most of the itemized expenditures do not show
any  sizable  impact  on  redistribution,  and  some  of  them  negatively  contribute  to  the  overall
redistributive effect. In a policy perspective, this calls for an agenda that methodically revise all the
categories of tax credits, in order to both simplify the structure of the PIT and to obtain resources to
reduce the tax wedge without affecting the degree of redistribution.
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Endnotes
1) These individuals are about 10 percent in our dataset, against more than one fourth considering
the whole set of Italian taxpayers. See the discussion in the next section.
2)  See,  for  instance,  the  online  guide  prepared  by  PwC,  available  at
http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/uk/taxsummaries/wwts.nsf/ID/Italy-Individual-Tax-administration.
3) An interesting exception is Albarea et al. (2015), who exploits information from different sources
and matching techniques to obtain information on a number of allowances and tax credits. Working
on  administrative  data,  our  exercise  here  is  conducted  on  actual  tax  reliefs,  excluding  any
imputation of ‘likely’ expenses, and on all reliefs of the Tax Code.
4) MEF (2011) identifies 176 different allowances and credits available for individuals in the Italian
legislation.
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Table 1: Redistributive indexes
Index CAFDataset
Microsimulation
model
Gini coefficient for the gross income 0.3191 0.4434
Gini coefficient for the net income 0.2705 0.3914
Concentration coefficient for the net income 0.2695 0.3908
Gini coefficient for the net tax liability 0.5501 0.6815
Concentration coefficient for the net tax liability 0.5377 0.6722
Redistributive effect 0.0486 0.0520
Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.0496 0.0526
Kakwani index 0.2185 0.2288
Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani index 0.0010 0.0006
Average tax rate (%) 18.50 18.70
Source: Own elaborations based on CAF (2012) and Bank of Italy (2012).
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Table 2: Indexes for deductions and tax credits
Deductions and tax credits Gini coefficient Concentrationcoefficient
Share of taxpayers
with positive item
(%)
Average value for
taxpayers with
positive item (euro)
Deduction for the main residence cadastral income 0.5667 0.1577 66.3 456
Deductions for social security contributions, alimonies and donations 0.9164 0.3641 49.6 428
Total deductions 0.6446 0.2429 81.0 635
Tax credit for employment 0.5860 -0.0497 50.5 1,041
Tax credit for work similar to employment 0.9990 -0.6267 0.1 952
Tax credit for retirement income 0.6116 -0.2950 47.1 1,143
Tax credit for dependent spouse 0.8797 0.1580 12.8 658
Tax credit for dependent children 0.8162 0.1699 27.7 646
Further tax credit for dependent children 0.9984 0.4740 0.2 710
Tax credit for other dependent individuals 0.9966 -0.0830 0.5 658
Tax credit for health expenses 0.7471 0.2634 62.2 173
Tax credit for non dependent individuals 0.9998 0.3198 0.1 372
Tax credit for health expenses for disable individuals 0.9991 0.1514 0.3 203
Tax credit for vehicles of disable individuals 0.9984 0.1632 0.3 945
Tax credits for guide dogs 1.0000 -0.2302 0.0 869
Tax credits for health expenditures of previous years 0.9999 0.1159 0.0 1,230
Tax credits for mortgage interests on the main residence 0.9111 0.2791 14.4 301
Tax credits for mortgage interests on other dwellings 0.9998 0.3074 0.0 204
Tax credit for other mortgage interests 1.0000 0.5521 0.0 93
Tax credit for the construction of the main residence 0.9952 0.3278 0.7 238
Tax credit for agricultural loans 1.0000 0.3783 0.0 68
Tax credit for life insurance 0.8921 0.3272 22.3 104
Tax credit for education expenses 0.9703 0.4488 6.2 153
Tax credit for funeral expenses 0.9846 0.1856 1.7 275
Tax credit for caregivers 0.9934 -0.0088 0.7 353
Tax credit for sport activities of children 0.9589 0.3854 5.6 41
Tax credit for real estate brokerage 0.9961 0.2595 0.5 154
Tax credit for rents of university students 0.9965 0.5150 0.5 301
Tax credit for other expenses 0.9751 0.3475 5.4 55
Tax credit for home restructuring 0.9124 0.4279 24.0 389
Tax credit for interventions for energy savings 0.9783 0.4944 4.8 855
Tax credit for home rent 0.9700 -0.2365 4.3 191
Other tax credits 0.9991 0.5554 0.1 235
Total tax credits 0.2347 -0.0153 99.9 1,682
Source: Own elaborations based on CAF dataset.
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Table 3: The Pfähler decomposition and the Onrubia et al. decomposition
 % of RS
 Pfähler methodology Onrubia et al. methodology
The PIT structure Wholesample
Only
families
with
children
Families
and
singles
Whole
sample
Only
families
with
children
Families
and
singles
Total deductions 1.11 0.30 0.78 1.22 0.33 0.85
Rate schedule 38.50 26.96 31.89 42.28 29.98 34.93
Tax credit for employment 20.85 18.30 16.09 19.63 17.83 15.15
Tax credit for work similar to employment 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.16
Tax credit for retirement income 35.54 27.78 42.87 34.29 26.86 41.59
Tax credit for dependent spouse 1.45 16.72 6.15 1.26 15.83 5.94
Tax credit for dependent children 2.87 10.55 2.79 2.45 10.30 2.73
Further tax credit for dependent children -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.01
Tax credit for other dependent individuals 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.14
Tax credit for health expenses 0.65 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credit for non dependent individuals 0.00 -0.40 0.48 0.39 -0.61 0.28
Tax credit for health expenses for disable individuals 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credit for vehicles of disable individuals 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
Tax credits for guide dogs 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06
Tax credits for health expenditures of previous years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credits for mortgage interests on the main residence 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credits for mortgage interests on other dwellings 0.00 0.66 -0.31 0.09 0.61 -0.39
Tax credit for other mortgage interests 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credit for the construction of the main residence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credit for agricultural loans 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
Tax credit for life insurance -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax credit for education expenses -0.13 0.07 -0.11 -0.07 0.04 -0.14
Tax credit for funeral expenses 0.07 0.00 0.09 -0.15 0.00 0.09
Tax credit for caregivers 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.08
Tax credit for sport activities of children -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.12
Tax credit for real estate brokerage 0.00 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.02
Tax credit for rents of university students -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Tax credit for other expenses -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01
Tax credit for home restructuring -1.09 -1.24 -1.36 -1.30 -1.36 -1.52
Tax credit for interventions for energy savings -0.78 -0.68 -0.68 -0.88 -0.74 -0.75
Tax credit for home rent 0.49 0.67 0.71 0.47 0.65 0.69
Other tax credits -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Total tax credits 60.38 72.74 67.33 56.50 69.69 64.22
Reynolds-Smolensky index 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of observations 1,314,877 131,833 576,205 1,314,877 131,833 576,205
Source: Own elaborations on CAF dataset.
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Table 4. The Pfähler decomposition on survey data
 Deductions Tax schedule
Making
Work Pay
Tax credits
Tax credits
for dependent
individuals
Tax credits
for itemized
expenditures
Total
Individuals 4.5 41.1 51.4 4.8 -1.8 100.0
Households 2.4 39.5 45.8 13.3 -0.9 100.0
Source: Own elaborations based on SHIW 2012.
Figure 1: The distributions of gross incomes
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
D
en
si
ty
 F
un
ct
io
n 
(%
)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Gross Income (Thousands euro)
Ministry CAF
Figure2: Lorenz and concentration curves for mortgage interests on the main residence
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